Gaza Peace Plan

The first phase of President Trump’s much-publicized 21-point Gaza peace plan is, for all intents and purposes, complete. The world watched as all living Israeli hostages were released, and all but one of the bodies of the dead were returned. For a brief moment, there was a sense of closure, a sense that, perhaps, the impossible had been achieved. But as anyone familiar with the region knows, in the Middle East, closure is always temporary, and the next phase is always more complicated than the last.

Now, the plan moves to its next act: the disarmament of Hamas and the implementation of an International Stabilization Force (ISF), a multinational military body tasked with keeping the peace, supporting the demilitarization of Gaza, and ensuring that Gaza does not once again become a launchpad for terror. On paper, it sounds like the logical next step. In reality, the chances of this happening are about as close to zero as one can get.

Let’s start with the basics. Hamas has made it clear, repeatedly and unequivocally, that it will not disarm. This is not a negotiating tactic or a bluff; it is a core tenet of their ideology and survival. Expecting Hamas to voluntarily lay down its arms is like expecting the sun to rise in the west. It simply isn’t going to happen.

But even if, by some miracle, Hamas were to agree to disarm, there remains the question of who will enforce this new reality. The Trump plan calls for the deployment of an International Stabilization Force. The idea is that a coalition of nations – perhaps led by regional powers, perhaps with Western support – will step in to keep the peace, oversee disarmament, and help rebuild Gaza. It’s a noble vision, but one that collapses under the weight of political reality.

So far, only one country, Azerbaijan, has explicitly expressed a willingness to send soldiers to Gaza as part of the ISF. But even that thin reed of support quickly snapped. By November 7, Azerbaijani officials told Reuters that they would not send peacekeepers unless there was a complete cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hamas, and any deployment would require parliamentary approval. Less than three weeks later, Israel Hayom reported that Azerbaijan had withdrawn entirely from consideration, citing an unwillingness to endanger its soldiers in Gaza. This leaves the ISF with no soldiers, no mandate, and no hope of materializing.

This was, frankly, completely predictable. No country is going to send its soldiers into harm’s way to save Gaza. No country is going to risk the lives of its young men and women to destroy the massive terror tunnel infrastructure that snakes beneath Gaza’s streets. No country, that is, except Israel. Israel is the only country with skin in the game. For Israel, the disarming of Hamas is not a diplomatic talking point; it is a matter of survival. It is non-negotiable.

The international community can pass resolutions, issue statements, and convene conferences, but at the end of the day, it is Israel that will bear the burden of ensuring that Gaza does not once again become a threat to its citizens. When all the shouting is over, when the world’s attention has moved on to the next crisis, Israel will more than likely return to Gaza to complete the destruction of Hamas – this time, perhaps, with at least the tacit approval of the world body politic.

There is, of course, another possible outcome. Israel could retain control of the 53% of Gaza that it currently holds, turning the so-called “yellow line” into a de facto border. In this scenario, Israel would maintain buffer zones between itself and Gaza, making it extremely difficult for Hamas to rearm, given that Gaza’s only border would be with Israel. This is not an ideal solution, but in the absence of a credible international force, it may be the only realistic one.

The lesson here is not a new one, but it is one that bears repeating: In the Middle East, international solutions are often little more than illusions. The world may have the best of intentions, but when it comes time to act, it is the local actors, those with the most at stake, who will ultimately determine the outcome. Israel cannot afford to outsource its security to the good intentions of the international community. The Trump plan, for all its ambition, runs aground on the same rocks that have sunk so many peace plans before it: the unwillingness of outsiders to pay the price required for peace.

As we move into the next phase of Trump’s plan, it is worth remembering that peace is not achieved by declarations or by the deployment of forces that exist only on paper. It is achieved by those who are willing to do the hard, dangerous, and thankless work of ensuring security on the ground. In Gaza, as in so many other places, that burden will fall on the shoulders of those who have no choice but to carry it.

Good things,

Ari Sacher