Lasers In Golden Dome

The United States’ ambition to construct a “Golden Dome” for missile defense reflects a sober recognition of today’s threat environment. Precision-guided missiles, rockets, artillery, mortars, and uncrewed aerial systems are no longer the preserve of great powers. They are cheap, proliferated, and increasingly used to overwhelm even the most sophisticated defenses through saturation. They can be launched from off the coast from a boat or even in country from a truck, as in Operation Spider’s Web, where Ukraine destroyed much of Russia’s bomber fleet. In this environment, the success of Golden Dome will depend not only on intercepting incoming threats, but on protecting the very systems tasked with doing so.

That is where high-energy laser weapon systems (HELWS) come in.

Much of the public discussion around Golden Dome has focused on familiar terminal defense assets such as Patriot and THAAD. These systems are proven, effective, and indispensable. They are also expensive, finite, and vulnerable. A single battery represents an investment measured in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and each interceptor round costs orders of magnitude more than the drones and rockets increasingly used to target them. An adversary does not need to defeat a Patriot battery kinetically; it only needs to blind it, distract it, or force it to expend its magazine.

High-energy lasers offer an elegant and necessary solution to this problem.

Unlike missile interceptors, lasers operate at the speed of light, draw from an essentially limitless magazine – they do not require reloading – and cost only a few dollars per shot in electricity. They are ideally suited to defeating the short-range, low-cost threats that increasingly accompany modern attacks: small drones, loitering munitions, rockets, artillery shells, and mortars. By neutralizing these threats before they reach high-value assets, lasers enable traditional interceptors to focus on what they do best.

This concept is known as “defend the defender,” and it is not theoretical. RAFAEL’s Iron Beam, with an effective range of approximately ten kilometers, was designed precisely for this role. It is the only operational system of its kind in the world. It does not replace systems like Patriot or THAAD; it complements them. Deployed alongside terminal missile defenses, Iron Beam and its mobile variants can form a protective envelope that prevents low-cost saturation attacks from degrading or disabling high-end interceptors.

The logic is compelling. A one-thousand-dollar drone should never be allowed to neutralize a one-hundred-million-dollar battery. Yet that is exactly the imbalance adversaries seek to exploit. We have already seen uncrewed systems operating freely near critical air and missile defense assets because conventional defenses are ill-suited to engage them economically or continuously. In December 2025, three unidentified drones were observed flying roughly 100 meters above Germany’s newly deployed multi-billion dollar Arrow‑3 missile‑defense radar at Annaburg/Holzdorf, days before its inauguration. German forces detected and visually identified at least one drone but failed to intercept it, despite authorization to engage. Military assessments concluded the incident was likely deliberate reconnaissance, underscoring vulnerabilities of high‑value air‑defense assets to low‑cost UAS. Lasers close this gap.

For Golden Dome, this matters enormously. The initial phases of the architecture will almost certainly rely on existing systems fielded quickly and at scale. Those systems must survive long enough to matter. High-energy lasers extend their survivability, preserve their magazines, and dramatically improve the cost-exchange ratio that underpins sustainable defense.

Just as importantly, lasers are inherently defensive. They do not escalate conflicts or threaten strategic stability. They operate within line of sight, cannot be stockpiled, and are optimized for point defense rather than power projection. In an era where escalation control is as important as deterrence, that distinction matters.

Golden Dome will not succeed by relying on any single technology. It will be a layered system of systems, integrating sensors, interceptors, and command networks across domains. High-energy lasers deserve a central place in that architecture, not as a replacement for existing defenses, but as their shield. 

If Golden Dome is to protect the nation, it must first protect its protectors. Lasers make that possible.

Good things,

Ari Sacher