Over the past few weeks, this blog has been discussing a new reality in northern Israel today in which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), after having decapitated Hezbollah leadership, are slowly but surely dismantling the Hezbollah terror infrastructure in Southern Lebanon, the Bekaah Valley, and Beirut. According to news reports, the IDF is now advancing northward in three separate vectors in order to deepen the achievement (an IDF term). Hezbollah will likely continue its death throes for months or even years. Rockets will continue to be fired on northern Israel and every so often on Tel Aviv and even Ben Gurion Airport. What options does Israel have? Are we destined to spend the near foreseeable future running in and out of bomb shelters? Must the IDF conquer the entire country of Lebanon? Is this possible or even desirable? Before we address these questions, there is one more piece to the puzzle that we must add.
The United Nations (UN) has a checkered history vis-à-vis Israel. The UN played a vital part in the creation of the State of Israel. On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, known as the “Partition Plan.” This plan proposed the creation of independent Jewish and Arab states, with Jerusalem, the capital of both states, under international administration. Despite opposition from Arab countries, the plan was approved by a large majority, including many countries that typically vote against Israel. But since 1948, the UN treatment of Israel has gone from bad to worse. Over the past ten years, the UN General Assembly has adopted 140 resolutions condemning Israel. In comparison, during the same period, the General Assembly passed a total of 68 resolutions against all other countries combined. The UN Human Rights Council has a permanent agenda item dedicated to discussing Israel’s actions in the West Bank. This disproportionate focus on Israel reflects, shall we say, a certain bias within the UN.
In the context of the “Day After” in Lebanon, the UN is responsible for two pivotal parameters: United Nations Resolution (UNR) 1701 and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
UNR-1701:
On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah militants crossed the border into Israel, attacked a military convoy, killed five IDF soldiers, and took the bodies of two soldiers back into Lebanon to be used as bargaining chips. Five more IDF soldiers were killed in Lebanon in an aborted rescue attempt. Israel responded by attacking Lebanon with overwhelming force, predominantly via air and artillery, and Hezbollah responded by firing 4,500 rockets into Israel. A subsequent Israeli ground incursion into Lebanon proved ineffective at staunching the rocket fire. As the death toll of Israeli soldiers began to mount, a cease-fire was brokered. The terms of the cease-fire were woven into United Nations Resolution (UNR) 1701. UNR-1701 went into effect on August 14, 2006, after having been confirmed by both the Israeli and Lebanese governments. The unstated purpose of UNR-1701 was to recreate the buffer zone north of Israel that existed until Israel’s unilateral withdrawal in June 2000.
Here are the key points of UNR-1701 (available here):
Imposing the full sovereignty of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanese territory. The Government of Lebanon must attain full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without their consent and there shall be no local authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon.
The Lebanese army (LAF) will be supported by a more powerful version of the United Nations Forces In Lebanon (UNIFIL) (more on this later).
The disarming of all “armed personnel” between the Lebanon-Israel border (known as the Blue Line) the Litani River, which lies about twenty kilometers north of the Blue Line. While the Hezbollah is not explicitly mentioned as being one of these “armed personnel,” it is clear that this clause is referring primarily, if not exclusively, to them.
Preventing the entrance of weapons into Lebanon without the authorization of the Government of Lebanon.
Between August 2006 and October 7, 2024, Hezbollah repeatedly and systematically violated UNR-1701.
Hezbollah armed itself to the teeth. To replace the “Nature Reserves,” a network of subterranean tunnels and depots that were damaged during the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah constructed an upgraded and a more extensive network of “Nature Reserves.” According to public sources, on October 7, 2023, Hezbollah had more than 150,000 rockets pointed at Israel. There is no place in Israel that is not threatened by Hezbollah rocket fire. Some of these rockets have precision guidance systems that enable Hezbollah to target critical Israeli infrastructure including power plants, water desalination plants, offshore gas rigs, and cell-phone towers. If the Hezbollah so desired, Israeli citizens would quickly find themselves without power, water, and cell-phone coverage. Since October 8, Hezbollah has fired more than 8,000 of them on Israel and, either by desire or by consequence of Israeli attacks, has not fired on Israeli infrastructure.
Hezbollah forces were located immediately across the Blue Line. A few months before October 7, Hezbollah set up a tent on the border as a show of sovereignty and as a finger in the eye of the Israelis.
Hezbollah repeatedly dug tunnels under the border fence to facilitate the capture of Israeli territory.
The primary enabler for Hezbollah to openly flaunt UNR-1701 was the impotence and the apathy of the Lebanese government and its army. As we saw last week, Hezbollah makes up a full third of the Lebanese parliament such that in many ways, the Hezbollah is the Lebanese army. More worrisome was the continued silence of the UN. Its member nations showed no gumption or willingness to stand up against open violations of their own resolution. The UN is fully aware of this. UN Resolution 2650, signed in August 2023, expressed “deep concern” at the continued lack of progress… of key provisions of UNR-1701 sixteen years after its adoption.”
Since September 23, 2024, when the IDF launched Operation Northern Arrows, the situation on the ground has changed drastically.
Much of the arsenal of Hezbollah missiles and launchers has been decimated by IDF attacks. In some estimates, more than two thirds of the arsenal has been destroyed. In addition, rocket launchers that are used to attack Israel are targeted and destroyed within minutes after launch.
Nearly every Lebanese town within 3 miles of the Blue Line has been turned into gravel. Weapon caches have been located and destroyed, buildings that were once used to fire anti-tank weapons into Israel no longer exist, and the Hezbollah terrorists who once inhabited the towns have fled northwards.
Tunnels that were to have been used by Hezbollah terrorists to swarm into Israel have been located, mapped, and destroyed.
The situation on the ground in Lebanon has changed drastically. Hezbollah has been weakened such that it is a mere shadow of itself. Implementation of UNR-1701 is no longer a pipe-dream.
UNIFIL:
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established on March 19, 1978, by UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426. Its initial goals were to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Lebanese government in regaining authority in the area.
Over the years, UNIFIL’s role has evolved, especially after key events such as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the abrupt Israeli withdrawal in 2000. After the 2006 Lebanon War, the UN expanded UNIFIL’s mandate to include monitoring the cessation of hostilities, supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces in deploying throughout southern Lebanon, and ensuring humanitarian access to civilian populations. According to the UN, UNIFIL’s current mission focuses on maintaining peace and security along the Blue Line. As of October 2024, UNIFIL includes peacekeepers from 48 countries. Some of the major contributors are Indonesia, Italy, India, Nepal, Ghana, and Malaysia. Other countries with smaller but still significant contributions include Spain, China, Ireland, and France.
Unfortunately, according to the many people I have spoken with who serve or have served in the IDF and in UNIFIL, the letters “UN” in UNIFIL stand for UNnecessary. UNIFIL, more often than not, has been a hindrance to peacekeeping than a help. There are three primary reasons for this lack of success: UNIFIL’s composition, its relationship with Hezbollah, and its Rules of Engagement.
UNIFIL Composition
Looking at the primary countries contributing to UNIFIL, the first striking phenomenon that one notices is that most of the countries are third-world countries. Their armies are, generally speaking, underequipped, under-trained, and suffer from corruption. They do not have maneuver capability and therefore effectively act as localized separate units, not as a holistic army. The only outlier to this phenomenon is Italy, which is a well-equipped and well-trained NATO force. The second striking phenomenon is that one of the primary contributors, Indonesia, does not have diplomatic relations with Israel. This makes IDF-UNIFIL collaboration and coordination difficult, if not impossible.
Relationship with Hezbollah
There have been criticisms and accusations that UNIFIL has not been effective in curbing Hezbollah's activities in the region. Some reports suggest that Hezbollah continues to operate in areas where UNIFIL is present, questioning the mission's effectiveness. Other reports claim that UNIFIL's actions, or lack thereof, have empowered Hezbollah to operate with relative impunity, effectively turning a blind eye to the group's activities. This has led to credible accusations that UNIFIL is enabling Hezbollah rather than deterring it.
Rules of Engagement
In order for an armed force to be effective, it must have the purview to impose force on the enemy. This purview is governed by Rules of Engagement (ROE), directives that define the circumstances, conditions, and manner in which the use of force may be applied. UNIFIL’s ROE are very narrow. As a peacekeeping mission operating under a UN Charter, UNIFIL has the mandate to ensure stability in the area, protect the civilian population, and support the parties in discharging their respective responsibilities towards achieving a permanent ceasefire. In carrying their mandate, UNIFIL personnel may exercise their inherent right of self-defense. In addition to the use of force beyond self-defense, UNIFIL may under certain circumstances and conditions resort to the “proportionate and gradual use of force” to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities; to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent UNIFIL from discharging its duties under the mandate authorized by the Security Council; to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment; to ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel and humanitarian workers; and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.
This is their mandate. How UNIFIL implements their mandate is another story. In practice, they are generally reactive if they do anything at all. The more professional units will do what they can with a restrictive ROE, and with few heavy weapons or a wider force maneuver capability. The others ignore, hide, and try to survive. They are often without pay, food, and other critical supplies as a result of internal corruption, completely unrelated to the UN.
One former Finnish UNIFIL soldier published a scathing j’accuse: “Our main duty was to assist and patrol with the Lebanese Army in the area. We would observe and gather information. Before the conflict when there wasn’t much going on we would, for example, count the amount of… Hezbollah flags in a village, are stores open, was the attitude of the population positive or hostile. When the conflict started, we started counting destroyed buildings in villages, civilians in the streets, any women or children, groups of men, ambulances, etc. If we found weapons or rocket sites, then we would inform the Lebanese army (LAF) soldiers patrolling with us and they would handle it. Our ROE before the conflict was that if we observed a possible/imminent rocket launch then we would intervene and attempt to prevent it by any means necessary. When the [October 2023] conflict began, this changed. We would inform the Lebanese and follow their lead. Also we were told if they managed to launch , then we should leave ASAP as the Israelis were quick with counter battery fire…
I think UNIFIL is a failure. A lot of the forces are composed of 3rd world countries who are there merely because the UN pays them. They drive around in… vehicles with bad visibility, foot patrols were no longer allowed after the conflict started so they can’t see [anything] on their patrols. Some countries were also not performing their patrols, they would drive somewhere and wait for a few hours, then drive back to base and say they completed the patrol. We were tasked on a few occasions to patrol the sectors of other countries and report how many patrols we saw because the higher ups… didn’t trust them.
The Lebanese Army is incapable of stopping Hezbollah. They drive in Humvees that break down uphill or can’t drive too slowly because the car will die otherwise… They would refuse to drive certain paths claiming it was dangerous, they would take wrong turns, they got mad when we took photos of weapons we found. Also all patrol paths are sent to the Lebanese Army, they know which route and which time we’ll drive it. This information is almost certainly relayed to Hezbollah, so they know to avoid us or hide their stuff. The most UNIFIL has done is stimulate the local economy.”
UNIFIL with its current composition, with its current equipment, and with its current Rules of Engagement, cannot carry out their mandate, let alone enforce UNR-1701 against a semi-sovereign, belligerent, and well-armed Hezbollah. UNR-1701 can only be enforced by an army that is well-armed, well-trained, and that has Rules of Engagement that give it the freedom to project force where required.
With our background on Lebanon, the LAF, Hezbollah, and the UN, we now have sufficient information to proceed towards resolution of the problem. Next week, we will propose some potential ways ahead.
Good things,
Ari Sacher
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