Process Over Outcome

When a government appears brittle and its society restless, the temptation for outside powers is to accelerate history through sharp rhetoric and firm warnings. Iran’s current crisis has produced exactly this debate in Washington, including whether references to the possible use of force can help guide events toward a better outcome. The President has been very clear in his warnings to the Iranian leaders that force against the protestors will be met with force. The question is not whether the United States should project strength. It already does. The question is how that strength can be applied in a way that aligns with Iran’s internal realities rather than cutting across them.

The defining feature of Iran’s moment is not the absence of opposition to the ruling system. It is the absence of consensus about what should replace it. The range of alternatives is broad, but unsettled. Some Iranians favor a return to constitutional monarchy, often associated with Reza Pahlavi, son of the Shah ousted nearly fifty years ago, who offers name recognition, international familiarity, and a clear break with clerical rule. Others advocate a secular republican model, typically parliamentary in structure. Still others argue for a transitional governing council whose sole mandate would be to stabilize the country, release political prisoners, and organize a referendum and free elections. There are also calls for greater decentralization to address regional and ethnic grievances. Each of these options has supporters. None has yet secured decisive national legitimacy. That uncertainty drives the behavior of those whose decisions matter most in moments of stress: senior bureaucrats, security officials, and economic elites. Their calculations are driven less by ideology than by risk. American policy should be designed with that reality firmly in mind.

This is where clarity without coercion becomes essential. The United States is most effective when it frames its engagement around process rather than outcome. By consistently supporting a time-limited transitional framework, followed by a public referendum and competitive elections, Washington signals that it is not invested in any single vision of Iranian governance. It is invested in legitimacy. That distinction matters deeply inside Iran, where suspicion of foreign intentions cuts across political camps, including among those opposed to the current regime.

Such an approach leaves room for figures like Reza Pahlavi to compete politically rather than be crowned symbolically. It allows republicans to argue their case without fear of imposed restoration. And it reassures skeptics that no external power is preempting Iran’s internal debate. In short, it lowers the political temperature while expanding the range of credible choices.

Policy tools should reinforce this posture. Targeted economic pressure remains one of the most effective instruments available to the United States. When applied with precision, it reshapes elite incentives without inflaming nationalist sentiment or imposing collective punishment. Measures focused on overseas assets, travel privileges, and commercial networks tied to the ruling establishment quietly alter assumptions about the future. Over time, they encourage hedging and fragmentation within power structures, which is how rigid systems begin to loosen. This kind of pressure works precisely because it is not theatrical. It does not demand immediate surrender or provoke reflexive unity. Instead, it introduces doubt. The more uncertainty elites feel about the benefits of continued loyalty, the more likely they are to explore alternatives, including negotiated exits or transitional arrangements.

Deterrence still has an important role, but it should function as background architecture rather than headline policy. A credible military posture reassures partners and discourages extreme actions, such as mass violence against civilians or reckless escalation. When deterrence is steady and implicit, it constrains behavior without dominating the political narrative. When it becomes explicit and declarative, it risks shifting attention away from internal legitimacy toward external confrontation, which rarely benefits reform movements.

Preparation is another essential element of effective policy. Responsible governments plan for uncertainty. Quiet contingency work on humanitarian access, economic stabilization, and institutional continuity is not a prediction of collapse, nor a desire for it. It is an acknowledgment that transitions are fragile moments. The absence of preparation often produces more instability than the transition itself.

This approach also preserves American flexibility as Iran’s internal debate evolves. A transitional council may emerge as the least divisive option. A referendum could clarify whether Iranians prefer a republic, a monarchy associated with the Pahlavi name, or another system altogether. By anchoring policy to principles rather than predictions, Washington will remain positioned to work constructively with outcomes chosen by Iranians themselves.

Critics may argue that restraint risks prolonging the status quo. That concern is understandable but incomplete. Legitimacy, once lost, is rarely restored. Economic decline, demographic pressure, and social alienation continue to erode authority regardless of external rhetoric. The greater risk is misalignment, when outside actions raise the perceived cost of change and inadvertently slow it. Leadership is not measured by volume. It is measured by whether policy choices alter incentives in the right direction. In Iran’s case, that means reducing fear, expanding options, and allowing internal alternatives, including Reza Pahlavi’s, to rise or fall on their own merits.

A disciplined American posture does not promise quick results. It promises better ones. By emphasizing process, applying pressure with precision, and reserving force as a last resort rather than a signaling device, the United States can help shape an environment in which Iranians determine their own future. In moments of uncertainty, that is not hesitation. It is strategy.

Good things,

Ari Sacher