Why Betting on Iran's Good Faith Is a Risk We Can't Afford

The U.S. began recent negotiations with Iran on April 12, 2025 in Oman. These talks, mediated by Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi, marked the first high-level discussions between the two countries since President Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA “nuclear deal” in 2018. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff led the delegations, initially engaging indirectly but briefly meeting face-to-face. Iran’s goal is to gain relief from biting U.S. sanctions without fully conceding on uranium enrichment, which it views as a sovereign right. As for the U.S.,  White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said, “The President’s priority is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon without resorting to military conflict. We believe diplomacy is the best way to achieve that.” The White House has described the talks as “very positive and constructive.”

I posit that the mere act of negotiating with Iran is in and of itself problematic. Iran’s actions over the past few years have led many in the West to question its trustworthiness in international agreements, especially regarding its nuclear program. Iran has exceeded uranium enrichment limits as capped by the JCPOA. Iran has increased its stockpile of enriched uranium to 30 times the JCPOA limit, it has restricted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – the agency monitoring adherence to the JCPOA –  access to critical sites, and it has concealed nuclear activities, both before and after the U.S. left JCPOA. Further, Iran has continued its ballistic missile development program unabated and is now working on missiles that can deliver a warhead more than 3,000 miles. 

Iran axiomatically seeks the destruction of the State of Israel. In 2023, Iran orchestrated a 7-proxy war against Israel. Hamas terrorists trained for the October 7 massacre in Iran. The Lebanese Hezbollah was armed and trained by Iran, as were the Houthis in Yemen, the Baath Regime in Syria, and the Iraqi dissidents who regularly fired suicide drones on Israel. Iran’s proxy arms were soundly defeated by the IDF, but it was not for lack of trying. Twice in the past year, Iran launched hundreds of projectiles – ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and suicide drones – at Israel. The fact that most were intercepted and that little damage was incurred does not mitigate its actions.

Iran has already enriched uranium to 60%. There are precious few reasons other than nuclear weapons that any country would enrich uranium to that level. There is most definitely no civilian use for uranium enriched to anything beyond 20%. Iran’s goal is clear: a nuclear weapon will enable it to succeed where its proxy armies did not.

Iran has amassed an array of enrichment equipment, most importantly high-speed centrifuges, so large that it could enrich any kind of uranium. Even the 3% enriched uranium it uses to power its civilian nuclear power facilities could be enriched to weapons grade in very short order. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that uranium enrichment is “non-negotiable,” signaling that Iran will not halt this aspect of its program.

The end game is obvious, and the rules are biased in favor of Iran. Negotiation is a fool's errand. Then again, why not give Iran the benefit of the doubt? The U.S. has been imposing crushing sanctions on Iran. The U.S. has brought large amounts of military equipment to nearby Diego Garcia, including 6 B-2 bombers that can drop the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, a 30,000 pound bomb that can penetrate deep underground and destroy Iran’s buried nuclear facilities. Israel has taken out the radars of Iran’s S-300 strategic missile defence systems, leaving the country completely open to attack. Perhaps the U.S. and Israeli pressure has done its job and Iran really is willing to negotiate in good faith?

Speaking as a rocket scientist, this assertion is completely incorrect. As rockets and missiles contain explosives, safety considerations are a critical component of the design process. Rocket scientists work according to well-defined guidelines. Our safety guideline is MIL-STD-882, “STANDARD PRACTICE: SYSTEM SAFETY,” published by the US Department of Defense. According to the DoD, “This system safety standard practice identifies the Department of Defense Systems Engineering approach to eliminating hazards, where possible, and minimizing risks where those hazards cannot be eliminated.” MIL-STD-882 defines risk (low, medium, severe or high) as a function of two factors: (1) The probability of a bad thing happening (Frequent, Probable, Occasional, Remote) and (2) the severity of the event (Negligible, Marginal, Critical and Catastrophic). For instance, if some event, say, a missile accidentally launching itself, will happen “Occasionally” and if it does happen, then the severity will be “Critical (no loss of life but people might get injured).” Then the risk in this case is defined by MIL-STD-882 as “Serious.” The rocket scientist in charge will have to find a way to reduce the probability of occurrence, otherwise this missile will not be allowed to fly. Now if the severity of some event is defined as “Catastrophic” – like a nuclear going off over Tel Aviv – the only way to reduce the risk to anything below “Serious” is to the reduce the probability of occurrence to “Improbable” – an event so unlikely that it can be assumed that the occurrence may not be expected over the entire lifetime. Do we really have this much trust in Iran? Given Iran’s history, the probability of it launching a nuclear strike on Israel is much greater than “Improbable.”  The risk assumed in this case is far too large. Continuation of negotiation is not only wrong, it is downright dangerous. A prudent negotiator should walk away from the negotiation table.

It's not rocket science. 

Good things,

 Ari Sacher