Tensions along Israel's northern border with Lebanon have escalated significantly in recent weeks, as clashes between the Israel Defense Force (IDF) and Hezbollah intensify. The volatile situation has led to increased exchanges of rocket and missile fire. As the situation continues to develop, the potential for a broader regional conflict looms large, drawing attention from the U.S. which seeks to mediate and prevent further escalation.
Hezbollah has been firing rockets and missiles at Israel continuously since October 8. Nearly 100,000 Israelis living within three miles of the border have evacuated their homes, turning northern Israel into a de facto uninhabited security zone. Tensions escalated exponentially on July 31, when Israel assassinated Fuad Shukr, the Head of the Military Wing of Hezbollah and a close personal friend of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah.
Fuad Shukr played a central role in the planning and execution of the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 241 U.S. service personnel. The U.S. government had offered a five million dollar reward for information that would bring him to justice. After Shukr was assassinated, Hezbollah vowed to avenge his death.
Four weeks later, after countless threats, Hezbollah prepared to launch an assault consisting of thousands of rockets and precision guided missiles, targeting sites as far south as Tel Aviv, including a “sensitive military site,” subsequently identified as the Gelilot Intelligence Base. But immediately before the attack began, the IDF launched a preemptive attack on the launchers that were fully loaded with rockets and missiles. With the help of exceptionally precise real-time intelligence, one hundred aircraft carrying about 300 tons of ordnance destroyed most of the launchers along with approximately 6,000 rockets.
Hezbollah responded by firing more than 300 rockets and missiles into northern Israel. Most of them were either intercepted by Iron Dome or fell in open areas. It was clear that Hezbollah was in disarray. They responded by falsely reporting that not only was their attack a “complete success” but that they had also succeeded in hitting the above-mentioned “sensitive military site.” Further, they claimed that the Israeli government was covering up the results of the strike. Such a cover-up would have been impossible, as the strike would have been seen and heard by tens of thousands of Israelis. The Hezbollah response was reminiscent of the farcical “Baghdad Bob,” the Iraqi Minister of Information who, during the Second Gulf War, broadcasted colorful and widely-mocked press briefings in which he often made ludicrous claims about Iraqi military successes against American coalition forces.
After the preemptive IDF attack, Hezbollah went silent other than some sporadic launches of a rocket or two. This was a huge win for Israel.
The most important commodity in the Middle East, other than water, is deterrence.
If Israel projects power, if even the slightest impingement on Israeli sovereignty is immediately and harshly punished, then this will buy the enemy’s respect and silence. Conversely, if the enemy believes that Israel is weak, then it will respond with power of its own. Israeli willingness to evacuate her citizens for nearly a year combined with what was seen as weak responses to Hezbollah attacks adversely impacted Israeli deterrence and thus emboldened Hezbollah. The assassination of Shukr in the heart of Beirut followed by the fierce and precise preemptive attack on Hezbollah rockets and launchers restored at least some of that deterrence.
That lasted less than a week. Four days after the preemptive attack, Hezbollah began testing the IDF to see whether their show of force was a lasting change in strategy or just a “one-off.” It began firing rockets at an ever-increasing pace. The IDF response was a sort of “tit-for-tat”. They would destroy the rocket launchers shortly after they had fired their rockets at Israeli towns and they would drop a bomb here or there, perhaps carrying out a targeted killing against some low-ranking Hezbollah commander.
Slowly but surely, Hezbollah began to regain their mojo. They increased the size of the rocket salvos fired at Israel from two rockets at a time to ten to thirty to more than fifty rockets fired this Sunday morning on Kiryat Shemona, once a vibrant town that until October 7 served as the Capital of the Galilee. (One direct hit and no injuries reported, most likely because nearly no-one lives there any more). Hezbollah 1, Deterrence 0.
Last week, something truly shocking occurred. Residents of a certain area in the north would receive instructions from the Homefront Command to go indoors, not to congregate, and to remain close to bomb shelters. Israelis call this “Konenut Sefiga,” literally, “Absorption Standby,” or “Prepare to be fired upon.” Then, less than one hour later, Hezbollah would fire a salvo of rockets to that area, just as predicted. I saw this transpire at least three times over two days.
This begs a question: If the IDF had intelligence that Hezbollah was readying to launch an attack, why did it not launch a preemptive strike of its own?
The rockets in these Hezbollah attacks were launched by no more than three launchers. Fighter bombers are always patrolling the skies over northern Israel and southern Lebanon. Are we to believe that not even one of them could be tasked to take out those three launchers before the attack began? A colleague at work lives about 5 miles from the border. Her town is far enough from the border not to have been evacuated, and her child still goes to school every day. The problem is that her child goes to and from school on a school bus along with 50 other children. If the IDF is so interested in preventing people from her town from congregating, how can they allow their children to ride a bus to school? The danger for a catastrophic event is clear and present.
Make no mistake: The Hezbollah sees this behavior and takes note. The deterrence that was gained two weeks ago is being frittered away. The preemptive attack two weeks ago was an outlier. Hezbollah is slowly but surely ramping up the pressure. Here are the numbers of launches from Lebanon to Israel during the past 8 months:
In the last month there was an increase of 20% compared to the month before it, and an increase of more than 4 times compared to the month of January. The upward trend is evidence as is the cycle of violence: The Hezbollah attacks, the IDF shows restraint, and the Hezbollah attacks again with even greater ferocity.
What is the solution? In 2006, after the Second Lebanon War, the United Nations passed a resolution called UNR-1701 that was, among other things, meant to determine the boundary of fighting forces of either side. UNR-1701 calls for “security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of [UN troops]… deployed in this area.”
In other words, the Hezbollah must move all its forces above the Litani River. The Litani River is a much more favorable land border for Israel than the current one. The current border – the above-mentioned Blue Line – is an arbitrary line that meanders through dense forests, goes up and down hills and crosses brooks and streams. Historically, the principles that created the Blue Line were influenced by the Paulet–Newcombe Agreement between 1920 and 1923, which delineated boundaries between the British and French mandates in the region, but it was never actually agreed upon by either side.
The Blue Line is problematic in a number of ways:
It leaves Hezbollah on Israel’s doorstep, close enough where they can fire anti-tank weapons short-range rockets on Israeli towns and army bases at will. Given the events of the past year, Israeli citizens would be foolhardy to ever return to their towns if the Blue Line remains the border. Indeed, Hassan Nasrallah said at a recent speech that northern Israelis will return to their homes when he decides they can.
If the Blue Line is ever breached by Hezbollah forces, they will be able to enter Israeli towns in less than 5 minutes.
The Litani River is a far better border.
The Litani is quite wide and it lies at the bottom of a steep embankment, offering natural protection on both sides.
The Litani is about 18 miles from the northernmost Israeli town, protecting it from anti-tank weapons and from much of the Hezbollah rocket arsenal.
Hezbollah has never complied with UNR-1701. All of the peacemaking negotiations over the past year led by U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein, who in 2022 successfully brokered a treaty determining the naval border between Israel and Lebanon, have concentrated on enticing Hezbollah to comply with the resolution. According to the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Jarida, the U.S. has recently forwarded an idea in which Israel and Lebanon will swap land in return for Hezbollah retreating by 6 miles from the border. There is no compelling reason to believe that Hezbollah will never honor UNR-1701 of its own free will. They have absolutely no incentive to negotiate. The only way to move their forces above the Litani is to oust them with overwhelming force. After the Hezbollah have been pushed north of the Litani, the IDF will assume security responsibilities for the new security zone, similar as they did from 1982 to 2000. No Israeli citizens will live north of the Blue Line so as to maintain separation. Southern Lebanese citizens will likely be required to evacuate their towns similar to the way Israelis have evacuated their northern towns over the past year. This is already happening. The Lebanese government has stated that approximately 102,000 Lebanese civilians have evacuated southern Lebanon, and approximately 20,000 houses across southern Lebanon, as well as a few further north, have been damaged. The IDF treats southern Lebanese Hezbollah strongholds as “kill zones.” Anyone seen in the town is a legitimate target. While further evacuation of Lebanese towns would admittedly be dogged with humanitarian issues, there may very well be no other choice. Israel is fighting a war for her very existence.
Israel must do what Israel needs to do, something that, to date, Israel has been unwilling to do. The U.S. should give Israel the military and diplomatic backing it requires to achieve her goals. Seeing Israel’s deterrence bolstered by her greatest ally, Iran will take notice and a broader regional conflict might be prevented.
Good Things,
Ari Sacher
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