Operation Strength and Sword

On March 17, Israel unleashed a massive wave of airstrikes into Gaza, signaling the beginning of “Operation Strength and Sword.” The operation was launched after a two-month ceasefire crumbled. The ceasefire, brokered by the U.S., Egypt, and Qatar, started January 19, 2025. The ceasefire aimed to swap hostages for prisoners, pull Israeli troops out of Gaza, and pump aid into Gaza. Phase 1 wrapped by early March, freeing 25 Israeli hostages alive and 5 Thai workers, plus the bodies of 8 hostages who were murdered in captivity by the Hamas (including the Bibas family). Talks for Phase 2, meant to end the war, stalled. Hamas would not budge on releasing 59 remaining hostages, of which 24 are believed alive. Israel refused to fully withdraw or lift the siege without a total Hamas surrender. Hamas, for its part, refused to negotiate for the release of further hostages, leaving Israel with little choice but to apply firm pressure.

Israel has been at war with Hamas for nearly a year and a half. One could be excused for asking what Israel hopes to gain this time around that it was unable to attain up before January 19. Nevertheless, there are multiple reasons why Israel should finally be able to achieve its goal of a total Hamas surrender. Nearly all of the reasons pertain to initial conditions far more favorable than when the “Swords of Iron” war began on October 7, 2023:

1. Initiative: “Swords of Iron” was foisted on Israel after thousands of Hamas terrorists breached the “unbreachable” wall that separates Gaza from Israel and massacred more than 1,200 Israeli – men, women and children – and took 254 captives back into Gaza where they were kept in  brutal conditions, mostly underground.  Israel was caught brutally unprepared. The results of the recent General Security Service (GSS – also known as Shabak, or simply “Shin-Bet”) board of inquiry admitted that Israeli intelligence believed that Hamas was deterred, that they were happy receiving Qatari cash and administering Gaza. On the night before October 7, when reports were received of “anomalies” at the border, the GSS recommended against waking the Prime Minister, concerned that an Israeli response might accidentally trigger an all-out war. They were wrong. Operation “Strength and Sword,” on the other hand, began with an Israeli surprise attack. The Israel Air Force (IAF) hit Gaza City, Khan Yunis, Rafah, and then the IDF followed up with ground ops, rolling tanks and troops into central and southern Gaza, seizing key routes like the Netzarim Corridor and routing civilians into safe areas. Hamas likely felt that Israel was deterred, that anti-government demonstrations would prevent them from attacking and risking the lives of the hostages. They were wrong.

2. Hamas Organization: In the first round of fighting, Hamas lost most of its political and military leadership, including Yahya Sinwar, the Head of Hamas in Gaza and architect of the October 7 massacre. The Hamas military was reduced to a non-centralized band of guerillas, severely limiting its ability to project force. Its political leadership was decimated by targeted killing. This trend has continued in Operation Strength and Sword: So far the IDF has assassinated the Director general of Hamas’s Justice Ministry and the head of Hamas’s Interior Ministry, as well as a senior official from Hamas’s internal security apparatus and a Battalion Commander. Further, replacements of some of the people who replaced officials assassinated in the previous rounds were, themselves, assassinated. The deterrence effect is extensive.

3. Military Power: In the previous round, Hamas lost a large portion of its offensive capabilities, especially in its ability to sustain rocket fire on Israeli urban areas. Weapon depots were destroyed, as were most of its rocket manufacturing plants and machinery. This is illustrated by a decision taken by the Israel Home Front Command to remove all rocket-related safety restrictions in the Gaza Envelope less than one week from the initiation of the operation. Nearly all of Hamas’s training bases were destroyed. After Israel captured Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor on the Gaza-Egypt border in the early summer of 2024, Hamas’s ability to smuggle in weapons has been shut down. Due to the lack of training facilities, Hamas is unable to train new recruits, such that the 15,000 new soldiers that Hamas has recruited since January 2025, according to U.S. intelligence, are poorly armed and poorly trained, no match for the IDF.

4. U.S. Support: From the day of the massacre, the Biden Administration provided military support to Israel in the form of missile defense systems, such as Iron Dome interceptors, and offensive weapons, such as Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits that turn 2000-lb “dumb bombs” into precision guided munitions. As Israel pressed southwards, towards the Hamas stronghold of Khan Yunis and Rafah, support from the administration waned. Critical shipments of offensive weapons stalled, leaving Israel no choice but to reduce the ferocity of the bombing, enabling Hamas to live another day. President Trump renewed the flow of weapons immediately after he took office. The Trump administration has publicly supported Israel’s resumption of the armed conflict. The White House issued a clear signal on March 18, one day after the operation began: “President Trump fully supports Israel’s renewed military operations in Gaza.” On March 20, U.S. strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen, after they fired a missile at Israel, let Israel zero in on Gaza without splitting focus. Analyst Yaakov Lappin suggested this was a tacit “we’ll handle Houthis, you hit Hamas” deal, freeing Israel’s hands.

Israel enters Operation Strength and Sword with both strength and swords; things it lacked on October 7. Israel now has the means, the wherewithal, and the international support to force Hamas to the wall and to achieve Israel’s end-game: to force whatever remains of Hamas’s leadership to save their own skins by liberating the remaining hostages and setting sail from Gaza, freeing Gaza from terrorist tyranny and finally offering Israel a modicum of security on its southern border.  

Good things,

Ari Sacher