Hebron Governance

Last Friday morning, two Palestinian terrorists opened fire near the Judea Junction north of Hebron, killing Staff Sergeant Ron Yonatan Roytman and Sergeant Yuval Shai Svilem and lightly wounding three other soldiers. The attackers, armed with an assault rifle, a handgun, and substantial ammunition, were apparently heading toward the heavily travelled Route 35 when they encountered the soldiers. Both terrorists were killed in the ensuing battle.

The Israeli response was swift, overwhelming and, importantly, not limited to the immediate scene of the attack. The IDF, Shin Bet, and the Border Police launched a multi-day counterterrorism operation centered on the Hebron neighborhoods from which the terrorists came. Hebron and nearby communities were sealed off, roadblocks were erected, and forces began systematic house-to-house searches for weapons and terrorist infrastructure while questioning dozens of suspects. By Saturday evening, Defense Minister Israel Katz said that about 2,000 Palestinians had been displaced from their homes; the IDF reported that roughly 200 locations had been searched and ten suspects detained for questioning. The military also demolished what it described as illegal structures posing a security threat near the site of the attack, while the homes of the two terrorists were measured in preparation for demolition. But perhaps most significantly, the response radiated outward from Hebron. Parallel counterterrorism operations were reported as far away as Jenin and Nablus, while security forces operated at dozens of locations across Judea and Samaria. The message was unmistakable: Israel was treating the attack not as an isolated shooting carried out by two men from Hebron, but as a warning that a much larger terrorist infrastructure might be stirring beneath the surface.

The objective is clear: prevent the next attack. But lurking beneath the operation is a particularly dangerous possibility, known in Hebrew as “hafikhat kanim”, literally “turning the barrels.” Israel is concerned not only about independent terrorists, but also about weapons held by Palestinian security personnel being redirected against Israelis. Once authority begins to fracture, yesterday’s policeman can become tomorrow’s gunman.

And authority in Hebron is anything but simple.

And then there is Hamas. Hebron has long been considered one of Hamas’s strongest centers of support in Judea and Samaria. Israeli assessments link the Jaaba clan, from which Friday’s two attackers came, with Hamas, while Hamas itself praised the attack but did not claim responsibility for it. This distinction is important. Hamas does not have to formally govern Hebron to wield influence there. It merely has to possess enough supporters, money, weapons, and organizational infrastructure to challenge anyone who does. Indeed, Defense Minister Israel Katz explicitly described the current IDF operation as aimed at dealing with “all the Hamas issues in Hebron.” So when we ask who speaks for Hebron, Hamas must also be included among the possible answers

Who controls Hebron? The Palestinian Authority? Hamas? Local businessmen? Armed groups? The great clans whose roots in the city precede the Oslo Accords by centuries? More importantly, who can credibly claim to speak for its residents?

Last year, five Hebron-area sheikhs, led by Sheikh Wadee’ al-Jaabari, offered a surprising answer. They reportedly proposed that Hebron separate from the Palestinian Authority, establish an autonomous emirate, and join the Abraham Accords. Their letter promised recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people and “zero tolerance for terrorism.” In return, they sought Israeli recognition of the proposed emirate as the representative of the district’s Arab residents, along with a new economic and political arrangement to replace Oslo.

The proposal is controversial. Palestinian critics reject both the sheikhs’ authority and the idea that Hebron’s clans can replace Palestinian national institutions. Some members of the Jaabari clan have publicly disavowed the initiative and disputed Wadee’ al-Jaabari’s claim to represent them. That rejection is not a footnote. It goes directly to the heart of the problem: nobody knows who truly represents Hebron.

We have seen this ambiguity before. Palestinian businessman and cofounder of the Judea and Samaria Chamber of Commerce, Ashraf al-Jabari, participated in the 2019 “Peace to Prosperity” conference in Bahrain, where the Trump administration presented the economic component of its peace plan. The workshop occurred more than a year before Bahrain and Israel formally established relations under the Abraham Accords. al-Jabari’s participation suggested that at least some prominent Hebron figures were prepared to engage Israel and the Gulf states outside the traditional Palestinian political framework.

That does not mean that Hebron is ready to make peace. It means that “Hebron” is not a single political personality. It is a mosaic of clans, neighborhoods, commercial interests, religious loyalties and armed factions. Some favor coexistence, some favor confrontation, and many favor whichever authority can provide security and livelihoods.

Israel can defeat terrorists and confiscate their weapons. The far harder challenge is determining who will govern after the soldiers leave. Peace requires a partner, but before negotiating with Hebron, Israel must answer a deceptively simple question: Who, precisely, is sitting across the table?

Good things,

Ari Sacher