Never Confuse Money With Power

There is an old rule in the Middle East: Never confuse money with power. Saudi Arabia has a great deal of the former. Recent events suggest that it possesses considerably less of the latter. 

Only recently, Saudi Arabia joined Turkey and Pakistan in the so-called Mecca Pact, under which an armed attack against one member would be considered an attack against all three. It sounded impressive. Three major Sunni states, one of them nuclear-armed, standing shoulder to shoulder. The photographs were magnificent. The communiqués were muscular. 

Then the Houthis attacked Saudi forces in Yemen, and the "Mecca Pact" promptly turned into a "Mecca Suggestion." Pakistan announced that military action was not under discussion. Turkey produced the diplomatic equivalent of clearing its throat. Both offered plenty of bluster and precious little else. When Saudi Arabia actually needed its new allies, it discovered that a defense pact is only as strong as the willingness of its members to defend each other. 

Meanwhile, the Houthis have demonstrated that they are anything but an irrelevant militia wearing sandals and robes and carrying rusty Kalashnikovs. They have launched Iranian-made missiles and drones at Saudi territory, advanced along Yemen's Red Sea coast, seized strategic territory, and threatened oil infrastructure and maritime traffic through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. 

Saudi airpower has not been sufficient to reverse these gains. A country that has spent hundreds of billions of dollars on some of the most advanced weapons in the world is struggling against an enemy with far fewer resources but considerably more determination. Weapons, like defense agreements, do not create military power by themselves. Military power requires doctrine, intelligence, command and control, operational experience and, most importantly, the willingness to fight. The Saudis have purchased an exquisite military showroom. The Houthis have built an army.

Washington's response has been conspicuously muted. President Trump, usually not known for his silence, has remained largely on the sidelines. According to reports, the United States had considered striking the Houthis on Yom Kippur but was dissuaded by Saudi Arabia itself. If accurate, the episode captures the Saudi dilemma perfectly: Riyadh wants protection, but it fears the consequences of decisive action.

The British response has been more concrete and, frankly, somewhat unexpected. London has agreed to provide an RAF Voyager aircraft for defensive air-to-air refueling, supplementing existing British support for Saudi air defense. The mission followed a formal Saudi request and is intended to assist Saudi aircraft defending against missile and drone attacks.

And then there is Israel. 

Reports indicate that Saudi officials have quietly sought Israeli assistance, including intelligence about Houthi deployments and possible defensive planning. This should surprise nobody. When the situation becomes truly dangerous, Saudi Arabia turns not to its loudest friends but to its most capable neighbor. Quietly, of course. 

The lesson for Israel is not that Saudi Arabia should be rejected. Saudi entry into the Abraham Accords could transform the region, strengthen the coalition against Iran, create enormous economic opportunities, and give Israel a public partnership with the most influential Arab state in the Middle East. But Israel must not confuse Saudi need with Saudi reliability. 

Riyadh has now learned three painful lessons. It is not a military power. Its public allies are unreliable. And when its survival is threatened, it looks toward Israel while pretending not to. 

Saudi Arabia should be welcomed into the Abraham Accords, but not courted at any price. The question is not only what Israel can do for Saudi Arabia. The question is what Saudi Arabia is prepared to do for Israel.

Before Israel invests its intelligence, diplomatic capital, and military credibility, it should ask one simple question: When the next crisis comes, will Saudi Arabia stand beside Israel publicly and reliably, as the UAE has largely done since October 7, 2023? Or will it once again seek Israeli help behind closed doors while denouncing Israel in public?

The answer to that question is worth far more than all the oil beneath the Saudi desert.

Good Things,

Ari Sacher