Stronger Together

For years, Israel’s debate over Gaza has been framed as a choice between two bad alternatives: conquer the entire Gaza Strip or allow Hamas to rebuild. The first would require a large and prolonged mobilization of reservists whom Israel cannot endlessly remove from their families and workplaces. My two sons are already doing more than one hundred days of reserve duty each year. Adding to this burden would be untenable. The second would return Gaza to the conditions that produced October 7.
But there is a third alternative. Israel can suffocate Hamas.
The mechanism is the “Yellow Line,” the boundary separating territory controlled by the Israel Defense Forces from the shrinking area in which Hamas still attempts to govern. When the line was established, Israel controlled slightly more than half of Gaza. It now reportedly controls approximately 67 percent.
The line is not merely a cartographic curiosity. It is a ratchet. When Hamas violates understandings or attempts to reestablish military infrastructure, the line can move inward. Every such movement teaches Hamas a lesson that airstrikes alone cannot: aggression has a territorial price. Land lost today might not be returned tomorrow.
The Yellow Line also does something more prosaic, but no less important: it creates physical distance between Hamas and Israel. Before October 7, Hamas could position rockets, anti-tank teams and assault forces within sight of Israeli communities. Today, much of that battlespace is on the Israeli side of the line. Distance matters, particularly because Hamas no longer possesses anything resembling the industrial infrastructure it once used to manufacture rockets in quantity. Every rocket fired is therefore not merely a weapon launched at Israel; it is an asset that is increasingly difficult to replace. Push Hamas farther from the border, destroy its production infrastructure and steadily deplete its remaining arsenal, and the threat to Israeli communities changes fundamentally. The Yellow Line is not only taking territory away from Hamas. It is turning geography itself into part of Israel’s air-defense system.
More importantly, Hamas does not truly control everything west of the line. Local armed groups challenge its authority, sometimes entering areas supposedly under Hamas administration. Palestinian sources cited by the Saudi Asharq Al-Awsat estimate that Hamas effectively governs only 17 to 20 percent of the Gaza Strip. That number is steadily falling.
At the same time, Israel continues targeting newly appointed Hamas military and political leaders. Hamas commanders are eliminated, replacements are appointed, and the replacements are eliminated in turn. Over the weekend, the IDF eliminated the Head of the Rafah Brigade, less than two months after eliminating his predecessor. An organization can replace people. It has far greater difficulty replacing accumulated experience, personal relationships, operational trust and institutional memory.
Hamas is therefore being squeezed along several axes simultaneously. Its territory is contracting. Its freedom of movement is disappearing. Its leadership is being repeatedly decapitated. Rival Palestinian forces are eroding its monopoly on violence. Its ability to govern is becoming increasingly theoretical.
This is not as dramatic as columns of Israeli armor entering Gaza City. It does not produce a satisfying photograph of a flag being raised over a captured government building. But wars are not won by photographs. They are won by creating a situation in which the enemy can no longer accomplish its objectives.
Time, once on Hamas’s side, is now working against it. Hamas no longer poses the threat it posed immediately after October 7, or even one year ago. Israel can maintain pressure without repeatedly calling up enormous numbers of reservists and paying the corresponding economic and social price.
A similar model is taking shape in southern Lebanon. Israel does not need to reconquer and permanently occupy every village from which Hezbollah might threaten northern Israel. It needs to deny Hezbollah the ability to rebuild freely, punish violations, destroy emerging capabilities, and demonstrate that every attempt to return to the old rules will cost Hezbollah assets, personnel, and territory.
The lesson is broader than Gaza or Lebanon. Powerful kinetic action remains indispensable. Sometimes there is no substitute for maneuvering ground forces into enemy territory. But military power is not measured by the amount of explosives dropped or the number of divisions committed. Sometimes the most effective strategy is not to smash the enemy in one enormous blow. It is to tighten the vise one turn at a time.
Hamas is still alive. It remains armed, dangerous, and murderous. But it is running out of leaders, territory, options, and, most importantly, air.
Good things,
Ari Sacher




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